[Election-Methods] Why monotonicity?

daniel radetsky dradetsky at gmail.com
Thu Jan 10 15:01:22 PST 2008

Steve: fix you mail client so it doesn't fork the thread when you reply to

On Jan 10, 2008 6:42 AM, Steve Eppley <SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu> wrote:

> I am not aware of any such cause and effect, since monotonic methods too
> are manipulable.

Obviously, I did not mean that monotonicity was sufficient for
non-manipulability. What I meant was that if a method is non-monotonic, then
in virtue of its being non-monotonic it has one more way it can be
manipulated. Monotonicity is therefore not of no importance at all, although
it may be relatively unimportant compared to other methods.

That was a goal decades ago, until it was concluded there is no perfect
> voting method. (Take a look at the Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulability
> theorem.)

I am aware of it, but it does not proves that there is no perfect voting
method. It says that systems of type X have one of properties A, B, or C.
One can interpret "systems of type X" as "all possible voting systems," but
this is premature. Systems such as range voting demonstrate that we may
define "type X" in a way that fails to include all voting systems, and thus
mislead ourselves into believing we have proven more than we have. Whatever
you think of range voting, it is a voting system and GST, AT, etc., do not
apply to it.
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