# [Election-Methods] "Strong Minimal Defense"//FPP (Whole), a new 3-slot FBC method

Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Sun Jan 13 10:02:23 PST 2008

```Hello participants,
I no longer advocate what I had touted as "my latest
favourite FBC method" because Kevin Venzke pointed out
how it could fail FBC, prompting me to compose this
example:

10:A>C
09:B
03:C
10:D
02:D=B (or D>B or B>D, sincere is B>D)

In SMD//FPP(W), using the "Strong Minimal Defense"
device B eliminates A and then C wins. But if the 2D=B
voters had instead voted D (meaning D>>B=C) then no
candidate would be eliminated by SMD and so D would
win.

Thanks Kevin. I'm still interested in 3-slot methods
that meet FBC or "3-slot Condorcet" and will probably
post a (hopefully) better method suggestion soon.

Chris Benham

http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-September/020863.html
Sun Sep 23 12:30:45 PDT 2007

Kevin, Forest, interested participants,

My latest favourite   FBC single-winner method:

"1)Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballot, default 'no
rating' interpreted as bottom-rating.

2) Eliminate any candidate X  who is above-bottom
rated on fewer ballots than is some candidate Y on
ballots that bottom-rate X.

3) On ballots that top-rate no candidates, promote
middle-rated candidates to top- rating.

4) Elect the candidate that is (now) top-rated on the
greatest number of ballots".

For (at least) the time being, I call this  "Strong
Minimal Defense//FPP(Whole)".

It meets a new criterion I suggest that I tentatively
label "Strong Minimal Defense" which states:

"If  X has fewer votes (ranking/rating above bottom or
equal-bottom) in total than Y has on ballots that have
no votes for X, then X can't win".

It implies both Minimal Defense and the Plurality
Criterion.

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