[EM] PRfavoringracialminorities

[Raph Frank]

On 8/29/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
>  Well, yes, but I meant something like that if you're switching from Meek
> (numerical solution for nonlinear systems) to an election system with a
> divisor component, then a single exponential equation might seem simple in
> comparison. Of course you would have to explain it, but the society would
> already be used to the idea that voting systems may have to be complex to
> give good results, and thus would accept it (if they accepted the
> explanation, or trusted those who accepted the explanation) more readily
> than those who were not used to that.

However, Meek's method has actual benefits (in terms of preventing
free-riding) over hand counted PR-STV.

Changing the d parameter from 0.5 to 0.49.... has much less of a real
effect.  It is very much a dot the i's and cross the t's thing.

>  That could work. However, the NOTA list would have to be longer than the
> ordinary list, I think, because in situations where NOTA ranks first, that
> means that the candidates below NOTA are not considered good enough, and
> thus by implication would not be considered good enough to give one's vote
> (as an asset) to.

Well, I was thinking that you pick one candidate as your
representative.  There is then an entirelly new election and that
candidate casts a vote on your behalf.

Candidates who stood in the first election and didn't get elected
would probably be banned from standing again.

>  I don't even think it needs to be malicious. If voters have sufficiently
> many opinions they compare the candidates on, that might cause honest
> differences in the 4th rank and below. Averaging, by necessity, throws away
> some of this data.

Yeah.  Any abuse would be between 'friends'.

>  Nor are thresholds in general. I don't like information being thrown out
> like that, so if the point is to make for a more stable government, I'd
> require a slight supermajority (50% + threshold + 1) and also have the
> German solution to executive transiency - the opposition has to agree on the
> composition of the executive before replacing it.

I don't think that is how the German system works.

My understanding is that they have a rule which says that the new
executive must get a majority.

Only 'constructive motions of no-confidence' are allowed.  This is
where the motion declares no confidence in the Chancellor *and* names
a replacement.

This is to avoid the situation where the Chancellor has resigned due
to a motion of no confidence, but they can't agree on a replacement.

> > In Ireland, the governing coalition always votes as a bloc.  They have
> > effectively "signed up" to the program for government document that
> > they publish at the start of each new term.
> >
>
>  Maybe that's a reaction to the weakening of party loyalty that PR-STV
> gives.

Well, the concept of voting as a bloc exists in both UK and Irish politics.

Apparently, the Irish were one of the first to use it, when trying to
get Irish Home Rule.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_Parliamentary_Party

>  From a distance point of view, the elimination process removes some
> candidates that are closer to the voters so that their "closest candidate"
> become someone that pass the Droop quota. In theory, that should work, but
> it's not perfect (as IRV, the single-winner case, shows most readily, though
> the effect weakens with multiple winners).

Right.  Something like CPO-STV should help here as it is condorcet based.

> > A single seat method should aim for the centre as that means that
> > everyone is best represented rather than representing one side of the
> > electorate.
> >
>
>  Does that mean Range is unsuitable for party list PR for the same reason --
> broadly, that single-winner methods are too center-focused for the party
> list transformation to be any good?

Well, RRV would be fine.

I am not sure how you would use RV for party list systems.

You could allow the voter to rate more than 1 party, and then divide
by the sum of the ratings, but that isn't RV.  It is just standard
party list voting while allowing a voter split his vote between
multiple people.

One option would be to use RV for the intra list distribution.

You vote for a party and then rate all the candidates in that party.
RRV is then used instead of a simple party list.

Ofc, that isn't summable.