[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Jonathan Lundell
jlundell at pobox.com
Sat Aug 16 17:49:37 PDT 2008
On Aug 16, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Aug 2008 07:27:10 -0700 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>>> I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a maner
>>>> to not destroy secrecy.
>>>
>>>
>>> You have to be very careful when doing so, because there are many
>>> channels to secure. A vote-buyer might tell you to vote exactly
>>> at noon so that the disk record timestamp identifies you, or he
>>> might, in the case of Approval and ranked ballots, tell you to
>>> vote for not just his preferred candidate, but both the low-
>>> support communist and the low-support right extremist as well, so
>>> that he can tell which ballot was yours and that you voted
>>> correctly.
>> In the US, at least, voting by mail has become so prevalent that I
>> wonder whether it's worthwhile making voting machinery absolutely
>> impregnable to vote-buying. All else being equal, sure, why not,
>> but if we trade off other desirable properties to preserve
>> secrecy, and leave the vote-by-mail door unlocked....
> There are two topics here:
> I LIKE the secret ballot, have had it most of my life, and know
> many others have similar desires for good reason. That thought
> inspired my words at the top.
> Vote buying needs discouraging, but I concede perfection is less
> essential here.
>
> Voting by mail requires humans obeying rules. I believe the rules
> in NY still require placing the ballots in an anonymous stack
> without humans reading their content while having the voter's
> identity associated.
California, too, or a method to that effect. It's vote-buying (or
coercion) that vote-by-mail enables.
The Civitas system has something to say about that, but it requires
quite a few other conditions to make it work.
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