[EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racialminorities

[Juho]

On Aug 15, 2008, at 22:27 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:

> On Aug 15, 2008, at 9:23 AM, Juho wrote:
>
>> On Aug 15, 2008, at 18:45 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>>
>>> On Aug 15, 2008, at 7:40 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Jobst Heitzig said:
>>>>>> It is of no help for a minority to be represented  
>>>>>> proportionally when
>>>>>> still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions!
>>>>
>>>>> raphfrk replied
>>>>> I disagree.  The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly'
>>>>> coalition re-organisation.
>>>>
>>>> I also disagree, but for a different reason and even when there  
>>>> is no chance at all of on-the-fly coalition re-organisation.  A
>>>> minority of 49% can be very effective in holding the majority to  
>>>> account and ensuring that the majority's proposals and decisions
>>>> are subject to public scrutiny.  Here in Scotland, our 32 local  
>>>> authority councils were all elected from single-member wards (small
>>>> electoral districts) by FPTP.  We had become used to one-party  
>>>> states, like Glasgow City Council where one party could hold 74 out
>>>> of 79 seats for just 49.6% of the votes city-wide, or Midlothian  
>>>> Council where one party held 17 of the 18 seats with just 46% of
>>>> the votes.  When such distorted one-party rule persists for  
>>>> several decades the political effects are very serious.  But we  
>>>> put an
>>>> end to that in May 2007 when we elected all our councillors by  
>>>> STV-PR.  Now there is effective opposition and scrutiny in every
>>>> council and the minority voices are heard.
>>>
>>> We see something like that in my local five-member school  
>>> district (on the California coast hard by Silicon Valley). The  
>>> electorate is factionalized (never mind the issues) and there's a  
>>> consistent 55-60% majority that elects all five members. As a  
>>> consequence, the board can hold closed meetings with impunity.  
>>> STV-PR (these are nonpartisan elections, so party lists are out)  
>>> would solve the problem nicely. (Full disclosure: I ran for the  
>>> board a few years ago, losing respectably.)
>>
>> If you have some issue X, wouldn't it also be natural to have one  
>> list "for X" and one list "against X"? I.e. lists but not "party  
>> lists". You may need to arrange the candidates anyway according to  
>> their opinions in some "lists" to make it clear to the voters who  
>> are "against" and who are "for". STV-PR gives the voters some  
>> flexibility that the list (or tree) based methods do not give but  
>> here I didn't see anything special that would speak against the  
>> use of lists. (Lists may also be more practical in some cases,  
>> e.g. if the number of candidates is high.)
>
> What JG said.
>
> Also, such a scheme would be, I think, highly susceptible to agenda  
> manipulation: who decides which issue is to be effectively on the  
> ballot, and who decides that the candidates associated with X and  
> not-X are sincere?

Citizens are free to form such lists. Each list may support and  
oppose any topics, and the lists are supposed to collect similar  
minded candidates together. Ballots may be just votes for individual  
candidates (not for issues). I don't see any specific problems in  
this case.

> In a party system, we generally have a degree of party discipline  
> such that a voter has some reasonable expectation that a candidate  
> on the party list will in fact vote for the party agenda. Not so  
> for ad hoc issue-based lists.

Yes, all political systems tend to generate some form of party  
discipline. (Candidate nomination, party rules, parliament rules,  
party ideology and election method (e.g. open vs. closed lists) play  
a role in determining the strength of the discipline.)

Ad-hoc issue based lists could also become party like (if I  
understood your concept of "ad-hoc issue based lists" right (same  
freely formed candidate lists for the elections that I discussed?)).

> Candidates can choose to emphasize issues (maybe X vs not-X, maybe  
> others) that they think will garner voter support. Perhaps a  
> candidate will successfully make the case that Y is a more  
> important issue than X, once the campaign is underway. If he can  
> persuade the voters, he can be elected under STV-PR, which is how  
> it should be, according to me.

Tree structures would do the same thing, maybe even lists (allow  
sufficient voting options if there are few topics with different  
priorities).

> STV-PR seems most appropriate here, where the voter votes for a  
> candidate who will be a relatively independent agent when elected.  
> Voters are then free to listen to candidates making their cases and  
> vote accordingly.

What are the STV-PR specific benefits that make it best in the school  
case? I guess not the party discipline related problems?

Juho


>
>>
>>
>>> I'm a little skeptical of supermajority or consensus systems,  
>>> which can easily lead to paralysis if an sufficient minority  
>>> simply refuses to compromise. The California state budget rules  
>>> are a case in point; a 2/3 majority is required in both  
>>> legislative houses to pass a budget. The result is a perennial  
>>> budget stalemate.
>>
>> In that kind of questions either a simple majority should be  
>> enough, or alternatively one could only reopen the discussion with  
>> >1/3 support but at the second round simple majority would be  
>> enough. I think supermajorities have a more natural role e.g. when  
>> changing (or amending) constitution.
>
>


		
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