[EM] Can someone point me at an example of the nonmonotonicityof IRV?
James Gilmour
jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
Sat Aug 9 14:58:34 PDT 2008
Juho > Sent: Saturday, August 09, 2008 9:19 PM
> It is not easy to use the monotonicity failures to intentionally
> improve/falsify the results (in typical large public elections).
I would go further, with respect to typical large public elections, with thousands or tens of thousands of voters, and say that it
is impossible for either a candidate or a voter to exploit the non-monotonicity defect in such an IRV election.
It COULD be different when a committee of, say, ten people elects an office-bearer AND the members of that committee know a great
deal about the likely voting preferences of all the member of the committee. Then it MIGHT be possible for a voter to exploit the
non-monotonicity to help secure that voter's sincerely desired result.
James Gilmour
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