[EM] [Election-Methods] about IRV & median voting (answers to Dopp, Roullon)

[Juho]

Here's another way to explain the same numbers.

Initial opinions:
6	B>A>C (or B>C>A)
2	A>B>C (or A>C>B)
5	C>B>A
4	A>C>B

B would win. But before the election the two A>B>C voters will change  
their (sincere) opinion to (sincere) B>A>C. As a result C will win. B  
thus got more first place support but lost the election.

Juho



On Aug 7, 2008, at 4:11 , Warren Smith wrote:

> 1. Dopp wanted simple nonmonotone IRV elections examples.
> See
> http://rangevoting.org/Monotone.html
>
> and here is another:
>
> #voters	 Their Vote
> 8	 B>A>C
> 5	 C>B>A
> 4	 A>C>B
> If two of the B>A>C voters change their vote to A>B>C, that causes
> their true-favorite B to win under IRV.
> (If they vote honestly ranking B top as is, then their most-hated
> candidate, C, wins.)
>
>
> 2. Roullin advocated "median voting".  That is discussed here:
>
> http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
>
> median has a lot of disadvantages versus averaging, but few
> advantages - which in my view are
> not enough.
>
> 3. Bolson's page on IRV
> http://bolson.org/voting/irv/
> I agree with it, he has independently reached the same views
> as mine
>
> -- 
> Warren D. Smith
> http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse"
> as 1st step)
> and
> math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
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