[Election-Methods] RE : Re: peer-reviewed work that is critical of IRV

[Dave Ketchum]

On Fri, 28 Sep 2007 16:55:19 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Howard,
> 
> --- Howard Swerdfeger <electorama.com at howard.swerdfeger.com> a écrit :
> 
>>Not peer review, but Ka ping yee of...
>>http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
>>has run sum simulations of election systems in 2d space
>>and it shows quite a few problems with IRV.
>>these guys (warren smith) also have some "Yee" diagrams
>>http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/Pictures.html
>>these show behaviour under different elections.
>>
>>In General IRV is bad at ties and near tie elections...in general
> 
> 
> Thanks, but this is exactly what I have plenty of, but doesn't help,
> since no one has verified it. I've made such diagrams myself (I actually
> advised Warren on how to do it...). Personally even I do not agree that 
> Ka-Ping Yee's representation of Approval is realistic or meaningful. And 
> I don't think arguments about monotonicity are convincing to others.
> 
> I want sources that say IRV is undesirable because of its compromise
> incentive and spoiler problem, and that these create some probability
> of disincentive to nominate third party candidates.

There is also complicating the campaigns.  Assume A vs B plus C>B:

If A beats B + C>B - normal A win.
      Else if B beats C>B, B wins.
      Else if C>B beats A, C wins.
      Else A wins.

Conflict as to voting C>B:
      For less, to help B win.
      For more, to avoid A winning.
> 
> Or, sources that say IRV suffers from a center-squeeze effect like FPP
> does. This is bloody obvious, but who has stated it in print?
> 
> Kevin
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