[Election-Methods] IRV/Approval/Range comparisons on Wikipedia

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Tue Sep 25 17:42:22 PDT 2007


>quote, "its theoretical criteria include 
susceptibility to strategic voting, which is one of AV's greatest flaws. 
Approval Voting is notoriously easy to game

--this is utter garbage.  First of all, "susceptibility to strategic voting"
is not a "theoretical criterion" at all.     

Second, AV was DESIGNED to be resistant to strategic voting, and is the only
voting method, among the usual common ones, that was intentionally designed
with that as the top design goal.   

>quote continued, "you simply don't vote for 
strong candidates that you actually approve of but are not your first 
choice"

--this "strategic" move actually is "strategicaly stupid" i.e.non-optimum,
generally speaking.  See   http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html
and compare columns B and E for large # of voters.

The writer here is advising somebody to be UNstrategic, then complaining that what
happens if they obey his advice, is the horrible consequence of strategic voting!

Warren D Smith 
http://rangevoting.org




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list