[Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Forest!

Binding agreements will not solve the problem completely I think. Assume 
the situation is this, with 4 candidates A,B,C,D of which 3 (A,B,D) have 
each received 1/3 of the vote, and with the following preferences over 
lotteries:

A: A 100, C 80, BD 0
B: B 100, C 80, AB 0
D: D 100, C 80, AB 0
(The number 80 in the first row means A prefers getting C for certain to 
getting A with 80% and B or D with 20% probability.)

Now if one of the three bluffs by claiming not to consider C a good 
compromise, the other two still gain by signing an agreement to transfer 
their probability share to C. Hence each of the three has an incentive 
to bluff if she can hope the other two will probably sign the agreement 
anyway.

The only solution seems to be that at least one of them announces that 
she won't sign an agreement with only one other but only with both 
others. But such an announcement would only be credible if that 
candidate would at the same time represent her rating for the compromise 
as something between 34 and 49 instead of 80.

In any case, it seems that also with binding agreements it depends on 
what information the candidates have about the other's preferences...

Yours, Jobst


Forest W Simmons schrieb:
> Jobst,
>
> I'm not sure how to define "rational" in this context, either.
>
> As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of 
> "defection" could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and 
> sign binding agreements during formal trading.
>
> My Best,
>
> Forest
>
>
> Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
>
>   
>> Dear Forest,
>>
>>     
>>> Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
>>> before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
>>> to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?
>>>   
>>>       
>> I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy 
>> to define what in this case "rational" means, since in this form of 
>> trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma 
>> and situations in which "bluffing" could work...
>>
>> Yours, Jobst
>>
>>     
>>> Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should 
>>>       
> have 
>   
>>> some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?
>>>
>>> Forest
>>>
>>>
>>>
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