[Election-Methods] Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

[Diego Santos]

2007/11/30, Steve Eppley <SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu>:
>
> Hi,
>
> In Diego Santos' example (below) the A voters who strategically
> downranked B had a strong incentive not to do so, assuming they were
> aware the B voters intended to truncate.  This highlights some
> advantages of the truncation strategy used by the supporters of the
> sincere Condorcet winner (B):
>
>    1. It does not need to be kept secret, and benefits by being announced.
>       Announcing their intention to truncate creates a group strategy
>       equilibrium (more powerful than a Nash equilibrium) in which
>       the sincere Condorcet winner is elected, assuming the other
>       voters believe the announcement is credible.
>
>    2. It encourages sincere voting by other voters.
>
> That assumes the voting method satisfies the Minimal Defense criterion
> (similar to Mike Ossipoff's Strng Defensive Strategy Criterion).  For
> more information about the truncation defensive strategy, follow the
> link to Minimal Defense at my website, which is at:
>     http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley
> The website is about the Maximize Affirmed Majorities (MAM) voting
> method, which other people often refer to as "Ranked Pairs (Winning
> Votes)."


I dislike MAM or Schulze(WV) because these methods require information about
other voters' behavior:
- or all voters are sincere
- or all voters are insincere (strategic or counterstrategic).

If perfect knowledge about all voters' preferences, and optimal strategies
and counterstregies are used, plain plurality elects the sincere CW too. An
electoral method is more near from ideal how much it is free from
manipulation.

* * * * *
> A simple way to minimize the need for defensive strategy is to allow
> candidates to withdraw from contention after the votes have been cast.
> (...)
>
> Another technique to make preference order voting much simpler for the
> voters is for each candidate to publish an ordering of the candidates
> before election day.  (...)
>
>
Candidate withdraw option and "how to vote" cards are welcome alongside
paiwise sorted plurality or other somewhat burying resistant with zero info.
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
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