[EM] Rivest+Smith secure (Re: danger of coercion)

Peter Barath peb at freemail.hu
Sun May 13 13:01:16 PDT 2007


>Nobody would be able to identify your vote unless you make it
>identifiable. Techniques for doing this have included punching a
>small hole in the ballot with a pin. Generally, rules prohibit
>extraneous marks on a ballot. I have also considered that, where
>coerced cooperation is a reasonable possibility, a certain
>percentage of ballots could be extracted and separately counted
>under closed conditions. Images of these ballots would not be made
>public.
>
>A coercer would not be able to know for sure that a voter had failed
>to cooperate.

Sounds convincing. Still, what I really can't help loving is
what Warren D Smith offers here:

>the paper is now available (unfortunately with some bugs introduced
>at the last minute, but  that doesn't really matter and we'll fix 
>them soon)
>
>#99 at http://www.math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html

And let me make a remark for that:

I guess Three Ballot - maybe even Vote-Antivote-Vote - can work
in some cases even without a machine (let's say: in poor country).
It's hard to believe to be practical, but who knows for sure.

For every yes/no question - for approval in n candidates, n
pieces of "do you approve candi"; for Condorcet, n*(n-1)/2
"do you prefer candi over candj" - the voter gets a perfored
paper with four ballots - two "yes"' and two "no"s - and with
every ballot an identically identified receipt.

First, she separates the four ballots and puts one of them
- a "yes", if she wants to vote "no", and a "no" if she wants
to vote "yes" - into a destroyer (paper grinder, fire, etc).
Then separates the receipts from the remaining three ballots,
and puts two of them into the destroyer, puts the three
ballots into the ballot box, and keeps the remaining receipt.

(So, as it has been stated in the paper, she has given one
more wanted than non-wanted vote, and nobody knows, which
one's receipt she has kept, so the ballots can be publicized,
so she can complain if her receipt's match lacks from the data.)

She does all this before the eyes of the ballot collectors;
she just turns the backs of the papers toward them, and
shuffles the papers like playing cards. Maybe a shoebox-sized
mini-booth can help her to cover.

I think this is better than usual voting booths in preventing
vote-collectors from filming her, and preventing her from
filming herself (to make proof for a coercer).

Peter Barath

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