[EM] MAMPO is probably better than MDDA

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Mar 22 10:50:00 PDT 2007


For some reason I don't receive any of Chris' posts. Thanks to Forest
for forwarding this to me.

Chris wrote:
>>This is the definition of MAMPO:
>>1. A candidate's opposition score is equal to the greatest number of
>>votes against him in any pairwise contest.
>>2. The voter ranks; those ranked are also "approved."
>>3. If more than one candidate is approved by a majority, elect the one
>>of these with the lowest opposition score.
>>4. Otherwise elect the most approved candidate.
>>MAMPO satisfies FBC, SDSC, and SFC like MDDA does. But MAMPO also 
>>satisfies Woodall's Plurality criterion.
>I'm interested in your opinion of my stab at something similar that 
>meets Irrelevant Ballots:
>"1 and 2 as for MAMPO.
>3. Give each candidate a score that is equal to its approval score minus 
>its opposition score.
>4. Elect the candidate with the highest score".

Sadly I don't see that this method can satisfy MF. Take an election like

49 A
51 B>A

B has a score of (51-49)=2, while A has a score of (100-51)=49.

I believe this satisfies FBC, but few if any of MAMPO's other properties.

Kevin Venzke


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