[EM] RE : More FARCS problems

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Mar 21 15:03:56 PDT 2007


--- Michael Ossipoff <mikeo2106 at msn.com> a écrit :
> What about FBC? One must not get a better result by burying one's
> favorite. 
> But FARCS and votes-only doesn't allow speaking of favorites. So, what is
> it 
> then, does top-ranked replace favorite?
> But then, if the actual ballot has to be consistent with the ranking, the
> top ranked candidate can't be buried.  So how could there be an FBC test?

One uses a votes-only definition of FBC, as I always do when proving that
a method satisfies FBC.

> And Condorcet's Criterion? Doesn't Condorcet fail Condorcet's Criterion, 
> with FARCS?
> "A candidate who pairwise-beats each of the others must win."
> But, the failure example writer is allowed to write the actual ballots in
> any way that is "consistent" wilth the rankings, meaning that it doesn't 
> reverse any of the ranking's order. Ok so the exmple-writer can have
> voters 
> ranking everyone equal, or everyone but their top-ranked candidate equal.

This should not be considered consistent with the rankings. If your
definition allows that, then your definition isn't adequate.

This should be extremely similar to your concept of what a "sincere"
vote can be when considering a set of sincere preferences with respect
to the valid cast ballot.

Kevin Venzke


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