[EM] RE : Chris: Approval

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Mar 19 20:41:51 PDT 2007


--- Michael Ossipoff <mikeo2106 at msn.com> a écrit :
> My criteria describe some ways that a method can limit strategy need.

The effects of your criteria aren't really being considered. You and I
use almost the same criteria, just under different schemes.

> What 
> reason is there to believe that they are or might be ambiguous for some 
> method(s)?

I bet you could easily contrive a method where your definition of
"vote A over B" is not currently adequate.

> I’ve repeatedly asked you to show that Approval and CR pass or fail 
> Condorcet’s Critrerion, by your fictitious-ranking approach. You never
> did.

I believe it is not true that you ever asked me this specific question
prior to February. Back in 2005 you asked me e.g. how I would define
WDSC. And I showed e.g. why FPP fails minimal defense. I don't remember
you asking me to show that some method passes or fails some criterion
under my scheme.

I'll address this specific question now.

This is how it works with CR: It doesn't matter whether the privileged
balloting system is ratings or rankings since Condorcet doesn't make
reference to ratings. Either way, the "intended vote" contains the ranking
data. It doesn't matter how the method selects its winner; if the 
privileged balloting system is rankings, then CR would appear to select
its winner for mysterious reasons (judging from the intended votes). All 
that matters is who the winner is and whether this agrees with the 
Condorcet winner appearing on the intended votes.

With Approval, there are several ways to treat it under this scheme (and
I'm already repeating myself, so I will omit them here), and not one of
them guarantees the election of a CW. I guess it should not be hard to
imagine, that when you suppose that all voters are able to specify
unrestricted rankings, that there is no way to phrase Approval so that it
will always select a CW from these rankings.

> You said:
> That's not the point of speaking of "intent."
> I reply:
> What does that mean? For one thing, not only are the rankings fictitious,
> but the intent to vote rankings is fictitious too. Anyway, as I said, you
> don’t want to speak of preference, but you think it’s ok to speak of
> intent.

Because there is almost no distinction between "intent" and the cast
ballot. The only distinction is that the former may have to be adjusted
to conform to the requirements of the latter. Instead of "intended vote"
I could just call it the "cast vote" and call the "cast vote" the
"adjusted vote." Sincere preferences and intended votes are not the same
thing at all.

> The difference is that you enshrine a privileged balloting system,

Ideally the balloting system is flexible enough to represent every method
you deal with. It could be that ratings are sufficient. But as I've
always said, there is no reason to define the system beyond rankings
until you want to use criteria that use more than rankings.

> You continued:
> I gave an example of dealing with CR
> I reply:
> You didn’t do so when I asked you to. Can you tell the approximate date
> of 
> that posting? Or copy and repost the example?

On Feb 21 I showed how CR can fail a votes-only interpretation of
SFC. Your reply was Feb 22.

> >Aside from that, why is it ok to speak of intent, but not preference? 
> >Intent is post-strategy. Here's an example of the process: 1. Say my 
> >"sincere preferences" are A>B>C>D>E. 2. Then I apply whatever reasoning
> and 
> >decide that I will be voting D>A>B and truncate the rest. Then that
> D>A>B 
> >is my "intended vote." 3. At this point I the voter do not make any more
> >decisions. Suppose the ballot format is such that I can only vote for
> two 
> >candidates equally and nobody else. Then my "cast ballot" is either D=A
> or 
> >D=B
> I comment:
> Voting B over A?
> You mean A=B, instead of D=B.

Actually it should've been just "D=A" without any "D=B." I thought I'd
picked "D>A=B" for the intended vote, in which case the cast ballot
would be "D=A or D=B" as written.

> You continue:
> , according to arbitrary resolution.
> What’s that? Is it like binding arbitration? Those criteria are getting
> more elaborate all the time.

Suppose the intended vote is D>A=B, and the ballot format requires voting
for two first preferences and nothing else. Then this ballot has to be
converted into either D=A or D=B. But for criteria purposes it can't be
assumed that the choice between these two will be random. So I call the
choice between these two "arbitrary."

> You continued:
> So an advantage of using intent over preference is that the voter only
> has 
> input at one stage.
> I reply:
> 1. I don’t know what that means, or how it applies to my criteria or your
> fictitious ranking criteria system.
> 2. If you tell what it means, will you also tell why it’s important?

It means you can't tell anything about the cast ballots from the
sincere preferences. Whereas the cast ballots are determined from the
intended votes. You get to use a simpler system without running into
problems like FPP satisfying Condorcet on a technicality.

> That's exactly as if you were only considering cast ballots, except that
> you 
> don't have to worry that perhaps the voter was not allowed by the ballot
> to 
> cast his preferred vote. Preference and intent really take the same
> approach 
> to not having to worry about ballot restrictions, in that they both try
> to 
> regard voter input before it hits the paper.
> I reply:
> So why the need for the elaborate, Frankenstein-stitched, inelegant
> fiction?

The first sentence in the above quote.

The only inelegant thing is the notion that cast ballots are 
automatically adjusted in order to conform to the ballot's format. In 
exchange, you don't have to word criteria as though you don't know what 
the ballot format is.

Kevin Venzke


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