[EM] Trees and single-winner methods
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Thu Mar 15 23:25:58 PDT 2007
At 12:48 PM 3/15/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
>Asset Voting is not "merely proxy voting". The voters are compelled
>to choose candidates as their
>proxys, who then become privileged super-voters. And in any case I
>don't support proxy voting
>for public political elections.
Chris has made some assumptions about the identity of candidates. In
particular, I've assumed that write-in votes are allowed. So what is
to prevent a voter from voting for himself or herself?
The only difference is that in the next stage all voting is public.
I'd be interested to know why Chris is opposed to "proxy voting for
public political elections." What is it about political elections
that is different from, say, corporate elections? Sure, there are
differences, but why do these differences imply that proxy voting is
to be rejected?
Corporate elections can involve budgets and affect human lives, in
large corporations, as much as can some governments.
>>What would Chris think about Asset used for multiwinner elections?
>Bad, but less so.
>A radical scheme that doesn't compromise voter sovereignty in the
>election process would be
>to have the voters rank the candidates in large multi-member
>districts and IRV-style eliminate
>candidates one at a time and transferring preferences until the
>desired number of candidates
>remain. They are all elected, with the weight of their future votes
>in the legislature being
>equal to their final vote tally.
That is a form of proxy voting. The delegable proxy concepts
effectively do this, the difference is that the vote transfers are
all controlled by the voter individually, in Chris's scheme, whereas
in delegable proxy the votes are effectively transferred through the
proxy's own choice of proxy. Then meeting rules define who has
I've generally assumed that direct voting is allowed, given that, if
deliberation is restricted and deliberation is public, the reasons
for avoiding it, even in very large organizations, disappear.
Essentially, the one who decides whether or not a voter is competent
to vote is the voter, not someone else.
Note that representative democracy involves a passing of decision
rights to representatives. With elected representatives, where some
contest is involved, some voters don't get free choice, others do.
With proxies, all voters have free choice, and Asset Voting is the
same. The "contest" is reduced to the bare minimum necessary for
deliberation to be reasonably efficient. Delegable Proxy eliminates
even that minimum as far as voting rights are concerned, the only
"contest" is in who has deliberative rights, and because of variable
voting power, some representatives might represent very few people.
Thus DP can be expected to provide much fuller representation in
assemblies, whereas with Asset, the smallest group with a common
representative is defined by the quota.
Note that Asset Voting can be, effectively, STV. Consider this: the
ballot could be an STV ranked ballot, which may be truncated. I would
assume, generally, that a voter would most trust their first choice,
so if a truncated ballot is exhausted, the vote would revert to the
control of the first-ranked candidate. It would be possible that the
voter could separately specify the proxy to control votes in the
event of ballot exhaustion, but I really don't see significant benefit in that.
With this procedure, if a voter votes for only one, it is, for that
voter, pure Asset Voting. If a voter ranks all candidates, it is STV,
There are details I haven't mentioned....
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