[EM] divided house problem of close vote (50%+1)
electorama.com at howard.swerdfeger.com
Thu Mar 15 04:52:25 PDT 2007
> Howard Swerdfeger's xls sheet btw doesn't behave exactly the same way
> as the written description of the method says. It doesn't let the Mars
> results drop below 45%. Thanks to Howard Swerdfeger for providing the
> sheet. Tthat is a good method to give clear (operational) definitions
> to the methods.
I might have left some stuff out of the description.
As there are some if Statements in the Spreadsheet that I don't like
having, for theoretical reasons. But, I do like having for practical
But regardless the Mars result can easily Fall below 45%
here is how.
1. Assume Mars = YES votes
2. Clear All of the Column "F" Labeled Results
3. Enter 44 in in Cell "F5" (vote #1)
The Part I didn't describe was a provision saying that if the returned
result from Referendum N is greater then the calculated score then the
referendum result replaces the calculated score.
> Note that it is possible that the sum of Mars and Venus votes need not
> be 100%. It is possible for example to have a faction that is eager to
> send a rocket to any planet. As a result both planets may get !50%
> results. In this case I don't know what happens if both planets reach
> the super majority limit at the same round.
I don't see how this is possible?
could you give me an example?
> One could also make the rules such that there is only one Mars vs.
> Venus vote at each round and the decision will be made when the balance
> will go from 50% to some threshold % to either direction. This way the
> election would be a symmetric election between two similar options (not
> a status quo vs. change type of election as in the original version).
yes I agree this is possible. even useful.
>> This means that a majority can get anything past if they stick to their
>> guns, however, it will take lots of votes (spaced say 1 day apart).
>> It also naturally scales the time spent debating based on how
>> controversial the decision is.
>> Handling multiple choices could be handled with approval voting. Using
>> multiple rounds means that the tactics for approval are easier to use.
> Yes. Even Condorcet could be used - just keep increasing/decreasing the
> elements of the comparison matrix.
> I think there could be also electronic election methods where results
> are calculated in real-time and voters may change their vote when they
> see what the current results are. The behaviour of a method in this
> situation could be also used as one criterion to evaluate the stability
> of the method. This kind of situations could make also the Nash
> equilibrium of strategic voting states more meaningful (I have earlier
> criticized them as not being a good measure for typical ("non real-time
> feedback") elections).
interesting, would your real time elections have some form of "leak" to
or would the persons vote stand until they changed it.
this a very interesting read on Proxy democracy that might be similar to
what you are thinking.
>> For example, if you could use the following formula
>> New Approval = 2/3 * ( Old Approval*3/4 + approval from vote )
>> if 50% approve of an option, it will get
>> Round 1:
>> 2/3*( 0 + 50) = 33%
>> Round 2:
>> 2/3*(25+50) = 50%
>> Round 3:
>> 2/3*(38+50) = 59%
>> Round 4:
>> 2/3*(44+50) = 63
>> At round N (with N -> inf)
>> Round N
>> 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3
>> Round N+1
>> 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3
>> I would suggest rounding upwards to the nearest percent. Ignoring
>> an option cannot get the supermajority unless it has 50%+ approval.
>> Alternatively, rounding down could be used and the supermajority
>> could be
>> set to say 65% required.
>> Interesting site
>> "what if anyone could modify the laws"
>> Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-
>> leading spam and email virus protection.
>> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
More information about the Election-Methods