[EM] divided house problem of close vote (50%+1)

raphfrk at netscape.net raphfrk at netscape.net
Wed Mar 14 03:15:46 PDT 2007


  Doubtless this won't thread correctly.
 
 Juho said
 > Some observations.
 >
 > The description talks only about the "yes" votes. Is the assumption
 > that the "no" votes mean "no action will be taken"?
 >
 > If we are talking about approving a new law then this is quite
 > typical, but if we vote for example about whether we should send our
 > rocket to Mars or Venus, then both sides should be treated in the
 > same way.
 >
 > In the described method repeated 45% yes, 55% no results do not lead
 > to final "no" (assuming super majority and new referendum levels 60%/
 > 40%). If we have only one rocket to send, voting first on sending the
 > rocket to Mars, then on sending it to Venus, then to Mars etc. is not
 > fair either. But maybe the method is not intended for this kind of
 > elections with two similar alternatives to choose from.
 >
 
 I get the impression the vote would go something like:
 
 Initial scores = 0
 
 Round 1
 
 Mars: 45% +0 = 45 (-50 = -5)
 Venus: 55% +0 = 55 (-50 = +5)
 
 Round 2
 Mars: 45% -5 = 40 (-50 = -10)
 Venus: 55% +5 = 60 (-50 = +10)
 
 Round 3
 Mars: 45% -10= 35 (-50 = -15)
 Venus: 55% +10= 65 (-50 = +15)
 
 Round 4
 Mars: 45% -15= 30 (-50 = -15)
 Venus: 55% +15= 70 (-50 = +15)
 
 Venus wins as >2/3
 
 This means that a majority can get anything past if they stick to their
 guns, however, it will take lots of votes (spaced say 1 day apart).
 
 It also naturally scales the time spent debating based on how
 controversial the decision is.
 
 Handling multiple choices could be handled with approval voting. Using
 multiple rounds means that the tactics for approval are easier to use.
 
 For example, if you could use the following formula
 
 New Approval = 2/3 * ( Old Approval*3/4 + approval from vote )
 
 if 50% approve of an option, it will get
 
 Round 1:
 2/3*( 0 + 50) = 33%
 
 Round 2:
 2/3*(25+50) = 50%
 
 Round 3:
 2/3*(38+50) = 59%
 
 Round 4:
 
 2/3*(44+50) = 63
 
 At round N (with N -> inf)
 
 Round N
 
 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3
 
 Round N+1
 
 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3
 
 I would suggest rounding upwards to the nearest percent. Ignoring rounding
 an option cannot get the supermajority unless it has 50%+ approval.
 
 
 Alternatively, rounding down could be used and the supermajority could be 
 set to say 65% required.
 
 
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com
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