[EM] "Possible Approval Winner" set/criterion (was "Juho--Margins fails Plurality. WV passes.")

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Tue Mar 13 23:31:21 PDT 2007



Juho wrote:

>I don't see any strong need to use the PAW criterion (or  
>corresponding ratings variant) for strategy resistance or for  
>"election target" reasons but they seem possible. They add  
>complexity, but if justified for some reason, then why not. I'll try  
>to think more and come back if needed.
>  
>

I'm not suggesting that PAW be explicitly made part of the rules of any 
method, and  the PAW
criterion is met by most methods including the simplest. So I don't see 
how it  "adds complexity".

The Plurality criterion is about avoiding common-sense, maybe 
"simple-minded" but nonetheless
very strong and (IMO)sound complaints from a significant subset of 
voters: the supporters of a candidate
that pairwise beats the winner: "X ranked alone in top place on more 
ballots than Y was ranked above
bottom clearly equals 'X has more support than Y', so how can you 
justify X losing to Y?!".

PAW tries to be a generalisation of  Plurality, and less arbitrary 
because it doesn't talk about top preferences.

Chris Benham






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