[EM] "Possible Approval Winner" set/criterion (was "Juho--Margins fails Plurality. WV passes.")

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Tue Mar 13 23:31:21 PDT 2007

Juho wrote:

>I don't see any strong need to use the PAW criterion (or  
>corresponding ratings variant) for strategy resistance or for  
>"election target" reasons but they seem possible. They add  
>complexity, but if justified for some reason, then why not. I'll try  
>to think more and come back if needed.

I'm not suggesting that PAW be explicitly made part of the rules of any 
method, and  the PAW
criterion is met by most methods including the simplest. So I don't see 
how it  "adds complexity".

The Plurality criterion is about avoiding common-sense, maybe 
"simple-minded" but nonetheless
very strong and (IMO)sound complaints from a significant subset of 
voters: the supporters of a candidate
that pairwise beats the winner: "X ranked alone in top place on more 
ballots than Y was ranked above
bottom clearly equals 'X has more support than Y', so how can you 
justify X losing to Y?!".

PAW tries to be a generalisation of  Plurality, and less arbitrary 
because it doesn't talk about top preferences.

Chris Benham

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