[EM] Chris reply

[Chris Benham]

Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> Chris--
>
> You wrote:
>
>
> Mike,
> Does this compromising "one C voter" have to unapprove C?
>
> I reply:
>
> No.
>
> Referring to this example,
>
> 52: AC (offensive order-reversal)
> 100: BA
> 50: C/B
>
>
>
> You continued:
>
> A>C>B>A. Approvals: A152, C102, B100. A>C 152-50, C>B 102-100, B>A 150-52
> DMC and ASM elect A.
>
> I reply:
>
>
> You continued:
>
> Here if one C|B changes to B|C
>
> I reply:
>
> It doesn’t matter if it’s B/C or BC, because, as I said, the approval 
> votes don’t come into play, because there’s already an unbeaten 
> candidate, B, who therefore wins.
>
> You continued:
>
> then DMC just becomes indecisive with B and C on the same approval 
> score and pairwise tied.
>
> I reply:
>
> Pairwise tied, yes. Indecisive, no. B wins because B is the only 
> unbeaten candidate. According to DMC’s rules, B wins.
>
> If the C voters vote BC, approving both, then, as you said, they make 
> a pair-wise tie between B and C. B beats A and pair-ties C. B wins as 
> the only unbeaten candidate. The Approval scores don’t come into play, 
> because there already is an unbeaten candidate. At least that’s how I 
> understood the rules of DMC: If no one is unbeaten, repeatedly 
> eliminate the least-approved candidate till someone is unbeaten. 


Yes, that is doubtless the best way: elect the Schwartz winner.

> If I’ve misunderstood DMC’s rules, tell me the correct DMC rules. 

No, looks like my mistake. I'll give some reply to the rest later.


Chris Benham

>
>  
>