[EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Mar 13 14:56:17 PDT 2007


--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> > > Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating."
> > >
> > > But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with
> > > more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem
> > > are contradictory.
> What I'm saying is that "I really want A to win" 
> is a sincere preference that is expressed by 
> bullet voting for A, and zero-rating B. If I 
> don't care so much, but I prefer A over all 
> others, I can rate A at max and B at some 
> intermediate rating. It all depends on how much I care.
> The problem is that we have this idea of 
> exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate? 
> *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration.

You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have
genuinely needed the money.

I don't really mind if you want to define strategic voting out of
existence. I don't think it sheds light on anything, though.

I mean, it's trivial for me to imagine myself in a Range election with
a variety of personal ratings for many candidates. Since I personally
don't vote with enough uncertainty to want to undermine my own voting
power (going to the polls is enough of an inconvenience), I would vote
approval-style. And here you're basically saying you have enough 
confidence in me, some random voter, to trust that I must truly care
deeply about this separation of the candidates into two sets.

Kevin Venzke


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