[EM] preliminary DAMC comments

Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Mon Mar 12 19:19:19 PDT 2007

Because DAMC recognizes majority defeats, and because River is similar to 
Ranked Pairs, a Condorcet version, DAMC lilkely meets SFC & SDSC. Because of 
having Ranked-Pairs as a relative, DAMC might also meet GSFC.

Because it recognizes only majority defeats, that might confer FBC 
compliance: You can bury your favorite to reverse a defeat, but it won't 
change a majority defeat, because your opposing vote can't do anything about 
the number of people who have ranked your favorite over your compromise that 
you're trying to save.

But DAMC's complexity is at least equal to that of Ranked-Pairs Condorcet, 
so it doesn't share MDDA's super-brief definition advantage. 
Complexity-wise, it's definitely in the Condorcet class.
And, being so similar to RP, DAMC probably needs a rule to deal with 
mid-count ties--an awkward thing about RP.

So Condorcet is what DAMC has to be compared to. But maybe it does very well 
against Condorcet, if it meets everything wv Condorcet meets, and FBC 
besides. That would be a new record in criterion compliances. So far nothing 
has been proposed here that meets GSFC and FBC. I guess it wouildn't meet 
Condorcet's Critrerion--the price for disregardng submajority defeats. 
Still, there could be timid electorates who need FBC more than Condorcet's 

As I said, these are just preliminary comments.

Mike Ossipoff

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