[EM] Improved versions of those 3 examples

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Mon Mar 12 11:21:46 PDT 2007

Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> I’d like to improve my three examples that I posted the other day, so 
> that they’re genuine FBC failure examples for DMC.
> In these examples, with DMC, either the B &/or C voters need to use 
> informed Approval strategy to save the CW, enforce majority rule, and 
> defeat the greater evil, or else one C voter could achieve that by 
> burying his favorite. 

Does this compromising "one C voter" have to unapprove C?

> 52: AC (offensive order-reversal)
> 100: BA
> 50: C/B 

A>C>B>A. Approvals: A152, C102, B100. A>C 152-50, C>B 102-100, B>A 150-52
DMC and ASM elect A. TACC elects C. AWP and WV elect B.

Here if one C|B changes to B|C then DMC just becomes indecisive with B 
and C on the same approval score and pairwise tied.

Methods that meet Definite Majority (Ranking), interpreting all 
candidates ranked above bottom or equal-bottom as approved, I believe
meet your SFC when there are three candidates.

Regarding the above example, I can't see any justification in the actual 
votes for suggesting that "majority rule" is violated by electing A.
All three candidates have a majority-strength defeat.

In general election results IMO need to be justifiable on the assumption 
that the votes are sincere and not just on some special presumption
that some of the votes are insincere. In the example, given that a 
concept of approval is being used, I can't see how any post-election 
that the most approved candidate should have been defeated by the least 
approved would be taken seriously.

Chris Benham

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