[EM] MDDA vs UncAAO, ASM & DMC

Forest W Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Mar 9 16:40:31 PST 2007


Mike O. wrote ...

UncAAO, ASM, and DMC ignore defeat-magnitude and magnitude of pair-wise 
opposition. They look at pair-wise vote totals in order to find out who 
beats whom, but then they throw pair-wise vote total information away. 
Throwing that information away has regrettable consequences.

I reply:

Making use of pairwise defeat magnitudes is a two edged sword.  Yes, it 
gives information, but it also gives incentive for voters to go out of 
their way to add more to the defeat strengths that they feel a 
strategic need for even when the defeat itself is already assured.  

Substituting Approval measures of defeat strength allows for strategic 
control without requiring order reversal or collapse.

In the zero info case, when there is no pressure for strategy, the 
sincere approval info is even more valuable, since the sincere approval 
winner is more democratic than the sincere CW, in a sense that Jobst 
has made clear.

Forest




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list