Forest W Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat Mar 3 17:38:56 PST 2007


That's right.  The C voters still have to use defensive strategy, but 
the moving the approval cutoff is sufficient.

When there are only three candidates, UncAAO is the same as Smith 

Here's another classical example:

49 C
24 B>A
27 A>B

Under wv, this is not a Nash Equilibrium, because B can unilaterally 
gain by truncating.

But if the direct supporters of the CW strategically put their approval 
cutoff just below A, then we end up with a Nash equilibrium, no matter 
where the B faction puts its approval cutoff.

49 C
24 B>A
27 A>>B

As in wv, no defensive strategy is needed under zero info conditions.  
But if you suspect that X is the CW, and you could live with X, then a 
prudent move would be to approve X and above.


Michael Ossipoff wrote:

>Alright, but the C voters are still truncating their approval, aren’t 
>They still need that strategy in order to put the choice to the A 
>about accepting the Nash equilibrium or else. True, the C voters don’t 
>to abandon A to the degree that they’d have to in wv. So they don’t 
need as 
>drastic a strategy against offensive order-reversal as they’d need in 
>(Truncation didn’t seem drastic until it’s compared to the only-partial 
>truncation of UncAAO).
>Now, if UncAAO meets (what I consider) the deluxe rank-method criteria, 
>and SDSC, that means that, while reducing the amount of defensive 
>needed against offensive order-reversal,  UncAAO retains the full 
>that a rank method can have over Approval.
>Maybe this is one of those times when something is found that is a 
>better than what was believed possible.
>If the strategy in your example always works, then that probably means 
>UncAAO meets SDSC. But what about SFC?
>Well, GSFC would be even better than SFC, but SFC would be good enough.
>I have other questions about UncAAO, but I’ll save them for another 
>Mike Ossipoff

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