Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Sat Mar 3 00:22:22 PST 2007


Alright, but the C voters are still truncating their approval, aren’t they? 
They still need that strategy in order to put the choice to the A voters 
about accepting the Nash equilibrium or else. True, the C voters don’t have 
to abandon A to the degree that they’d have to in wv. So they don’t need as 
drastic a strategy against offensive order-reversal as they’d need in wv. 
(Truncation didn’t seem drastic until it’s compared to the only-partial 
truncation of UncAAO).

Now, if UncAAO meets (what I consider) the deluxe rank-method criteria, SFC 
and SDSC, that means that, while reducing the amount of defensive strategy 
needed against offensive order-reversal,  UncAAO retains the full advantages 
that a rank method can have over Approval.

Maybe this is one of those times when something is found that is a little 
better than what was believed possible.

If the strategy in your example always works, then that probably means that 
UncAAO meets SDSC. But what about SFC?

Well, GSFC would be even better than SFC, but SFC would be good enough.

I have other questions about UncAAO, but I’ll save them for another posting.

Mike Ossipoff

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