[Election-Methods] Study Data, Personal Utility with Range 2 election

Elisabeth Varin stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Fri Jul 27 10:28:17 PDT 2007


Hi Abd, and M. Smith if I understood well,

I checked your spreadsheet.

You are missing the -1 cases for A.
Thus the impact on the sincere ballot compared to the approval one is 
overestimated.
Try again considering -1 , 0 and 1 as the three rests after removing your 
offset.
You should find different results.

The emperor is not naked, he is just not well dressed...

S. Rouillon

>From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
>To: election-methods at electorama.com
>Subject: [Election-Methods] Study Data,Personal Utility with Range 2 
>election
>Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2007 22:00:14 -0400
>
>http://www.beyondpolitics.org/OptimalRangeVote.htm
>
>Look at the last sheet. If your browser has trouble with the
>formatting, there is a simple page at
>http://www.beyondpolitics.org/OptimalRangeVote_files/sheet006.htm
>
>That page and the previous tab, sheet005, are reformatted for
>clarity, the other pages are my original 2-voter study and the first
>arrangement of the many-voter study.
>
>The election is many voters, so many that three-way ties can be
>neglected. The study looks only at conditions where the voter's vote
>can affect the outcome; conditions other than these cannot affect the
>voter's relative utilities for choices which *can* affect the
>outcome. (The utility for all those other conditions is 1.0 in this 
>election.)
>
>This election is a counterexample to the claim that optimal voting in
>Range is never the sincere vote.
>
>The election is many voters, Range 2 (3 Cardinal Ratings), three
>candidates, zero knowledge.
>
>The voter has utilities of 2, 1, 0.
>
>The *relative* utility for voting sincerely is 40/27, for voting
>Approval Style, either 220 or 200, it is 39/27.
>
>Numerous writers have informed me that this is impossible, but have
>given me theoretical arguments which do not address the conditions of
>this study. Most notably, this is a Range 2 election, and it is
>totally zero knowledge, and the utilities are exactly balanced for
>the middle candidate.
>
>
>
>
>----
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