[Election-Methods] Juho--WV vs Margins
Juho
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Jul 26 16:26:15 PDT 2007
On Jul 26, 2007, at 12:33 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> I pointed out on EM
> that, with Margins, sometimes the only outcomes in which a CW is
> elected at
> Nash equilibrium are ones in which defensive order-reversal is used.
>
> In other words, in some situations, the election of a CW without
> defensive
> order-reversal has to be a Nash disequilibrium, an unstable outcome.
>
> In contradistinction, with WV Condorcet, and with Approval (and
> RV), when
> there's a CW, there is always at least one Nash equilibrium in
> which the CW
> wins without any order-reversal.
>
> But some Margies are die-hards.
Different Condorcet completion methods have different characteristics
and none of them are without problems. A good argumentation on why
these described benefits/problems are crucial in practical (large
scale public) elections would be nice. Stability is something
positive but elections are typically arranged as one shot events, and
ranking based methods generally may have preference loops. => Do we
expect some strategy planning rounds where these properties would be
needed? In short, a practical example of a situation where the
methods have problems in real life would help estimating which
threats/characteristics are needed in real life.
> Juho says that Margins does better when voters are sincere. But
> I've posted,
> for Juho, examples in which innoncent, nonstrategic truncation can
> result in
> a violation of majority rule, and create a defensive strategy
> problem of a
> magnitude that doesn't happen in WV.
Does that mean that there are examples where margins have problems
but you don't deny that margins generally elects better candidates
with sincere votes than winning votes does :-)? I btw assume that
here "innoncent, nonstrategic truncation" means that there is some
deviation from the sincere opinion of the voter.
I gave some links to cases where winning votes have problems. There
are some where margins have more problems. Sorry but so far I haven't
found the winning vote benefits important enough to justify taking in
its problems. In case of a tie in performance with strategic votes
I'd favour margins because of its more natural choices with sincere
votes. I don't think the differences are really fatal since in most
regular elections the differences between the methods may not be very
big. I don't have any new additional arguments right now but the
interested readers can find lots of discussion in the EM archives (I
already gave some links to cover the margins side too).
Juho
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