[Election-Methods] Juho--WV vs Margins

[Michael Ossipoff]

As I said once before, Margins keeps coming back, like some kind of Romero 
cannibalistic zombie.

I drove the final stake into the Margins monster when I pointed out on EM 
that, with Margins, sometimes the only outcomes in which a CW is elected at 
Nash equilibrium are ones in which defensive order-reversal is used.

In other words, in some situations, the election of a CW without defensive 
order-reversal has to be a Nash disequilibrium, an unstable outcome.

In contradistinction, with WV Condorcet, and with Approval (and RV), when 
there's a CW, there is always at least one Nash equilibrium in which the CW 
wins without any order-reversal.

But some Margies are die-hards.

Methods that fail in the way described above, I refer to as "falsifying 
methods.

WV Condorcet, Approval, RV, Bucklin, MDDA, MAMPO, and maybe some others are 
not falsifying methods. Most other methods are falsifying methods.

In particiular, Plurality, Instant-Runoff, and Margins Condorcet are 
falsifying methods.

Juho says that Margins does better when voters are sincere. But I've posted, 
for Juho, examples in which innoncent, nonstrategic truncation can result in 
a violation of majority rule, and create a defensive strategy problem of a 
magnitude that doesn't happen in WV.

If you want to elect more candidates who have majority opposition against 
them, than Margins is for you.

Juho, read what I posted to you when we last discussed this.

Mike Ossipoff