[Election-Methods] RE : Is "sincere" voting in Range suboptimal?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Jul 25 07:00:42 PDT 2007


Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> There is a problem, though, one that my simulation tries to answer. 
> My work is exhaustive, as far as it goes. By excluding moot votes, it 
> is far more accurate. (Warren's simulations effectively exclude moot 
> votes, but in large elections the probabilities are so low that there 
> is a noise problem. Warren claims sufficient significance, however, 
> to confirm the method rankings he found.)

Just to be clear, by "moot vote" you mean the case where the observed
voter fails to have an effect on the result, correct?

The trouble with excluding these trials is that it is important to
consider how often votes are moot given various ways of voting. If it
didn't matter then it would probably be adequate to consider only single-
voter elections.

> The simulations with results on the cited page, inspired by Mr. 
> Venske's work, use a primitive random distribution, quite like the 
> "zero knowledge" distribution in my present work. The utility 
> distributions are even, random for each voter. This is *not* the case 
> with the general purpose simulator Warren has built, rather IEVS has 
> utility input options that can use various distributions.
> 
> So what is on these pages, rather primitively in some ways, studies 
> effecdt of various Range Voting strategies, a question of major 
> interest. They do not show how "sincere votes" stack up against 
> "approval votes" on the part of the rest of the electorate.

However, in my simulations no assumptions were made about the other
voters. Only preexisting total scores were generated, which could have
arisen from any strategy.

Kevin Venzke


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