[Election-Methods] RE : Is "sincere" voting in Range suboptimal?

[Chris Benham]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>At 09:51 AM 7/24/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>  
>
>>Warren implemented his own version afterwards; I suggest his results if
>>you're really interested. http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html
>>    
>>
>
>Yes, I'm familiar with the page.
>

I had seen it but forgotten about it.  Apparently Abd doesn't understand 
this table with which he is so
"familiar".

>These simulations are looking that the return to the voter from 
>various strategies, a direct answer to the issue posed by those who 
>claim that voting Approval style is optimal. It turns out that it's 
>optimal in some limited cases:
>

No.  Only when there are no other voters does any other strategy do as 
well. Of the ten strategies
considered in the table, seven of them are versions of  "voting Approval 
style".

>The result of the studies cited: in large elections with three 
>candidates, the optimal strategies are Mean-Based Thresholding, which 
>is an Approval strategy, and Bisector-based Thresholding, a different 
>Approval method which, with the utility distributions in these 
>simulations, appears to be identical in result (though individual 
>voter votes may vary). However, Scaled Sincerity -- which is what I 
>called Normalized Sincere Range -- is close behind.
>
"Close behind" is still *behind*.

>But with very few voters, Plurality actually beats those methods, and 
>so does Scaled Sincerity.
>

"Plurality" is of course another approval strategy, and  Scaled 
Sincerity only beats Mean-based
Thresholding with nine or fewer voters.


Chris Benham



-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20070725/400325f1/attachment-0003.htm>