[Election-Methods] RE : Is "sincere" voting in Range suboptimal?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> >  When I produced simulation results to
> >show that in the zero-info case one improves one's expectation under
> >Range by voting at the extremes, you essentially ridiculed me for
> bothering
> >to show something so obvious.
> 
> I'd be interested to see how I made such an 
> error. Perhaps I'd been influenced by the barrage 
> of experts claiming this.... and I'd like to see those simulations again.

In November you wrote:

>> This study seems to 
>> replicate the common criticism of Range Voting, which is that voters 
>> may attempt to maximize their personal expected benefit by voting 
>> strategically, in this case by voting Approval style, with a 
>> particular strategy:
>>
>> >These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>> >thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
>> >as in Approval.
>> 
>> This is utterly unsurprising. Venzke has simply confirmed the 
>> obvious.

Warren implemented his own version afterwards; I suggest his results if
you're really interested. http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html

Kevin Venzke


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