[EM] renaming DYN

[greg wolfe]

Forest W Simmons writes:
>Consider the standard Approval thorn-in-the-side example:
>
>49 C
>24 B>A
>27 A>B
>
>The first 49 voters mark S next to candidate C, and X next to A and B.
>
>The rest X out C, mark P next to their favorite, and leave
>their second preference unmarked.
>
>Candidates A and B agree on a deal to "trade" 24 votes.
>
>That gives 51 S's for A, and 48 S's for B, with 3 left for A to decide.
>
>A wins.

The "trade" language is misleading.  B assigns 24 votes to A and gets
nothing in return except for the pleasure of knowing that he worked to
make sure that C does not win.

This example is not convincingly realistic to me.
I see two things that can go wrong:
1. Some of the voters whose preference is "B>A" may mark B with 'S'
rather than 'P'.  If only a few do this then B will not have enough
votes to give to A.  Perhaps instead *ALL* votes should be considered
assignable proxies.  So voters only can mark P or X.
2. B and A are rivals and may not agree to pool together their
resources in order to default C.  It seems to me that the pooling
together of resources to elect suitable candidates is more readily
negotiated in multiwinner elections than it is in single winner
elections.

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