[EM] RE : Re: Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Kevin Venzke]

Juho,

--- Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> Margins vs. winning votes is another long term discussion topic on  
> this list. There have been many opinions and the final conclusions  
> may be more difficult to draw than in the Range strategy question.

I agree here.

> 1) It can be debated if Condorcet methods are in practice (large  
> scale public elections) vulnerable to strategies. If not, then both  
> margins and winning votes are safe enough and other criteria can be  
> used to pick one of them for use.

It's possible that a coordinated strategy may not be feasible, but that
is not the heart of the problem in my view.

Referring again to this scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B

Under margins the C voters have great favorite betrayal incentive without
any other faction having to use a coordinated strategy.

> 2) There are as well cases where winning votes are more vulnerable to  
> strategies than margins. So the question is not one-sided.

However, it is pretty clear that margins has a worse FBC problem than 
WV does. Simulations have shown this, but it can be argued logically as
well.

If margins outperforms WV in some respect, I'd like to be able to state
exactly how.

Kevin Venzke


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