[EM] RV comments
Chris Benham
chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Fri Jul 20 20:00:47 PDT 2007
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>At 07:20 AM 7/20/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Say, for the moment, we disregard the fact that the SU claims
>>>depend on sincere voting, and that sincere voting is nearly always
>>>suboptimal in RV.
>>
>>
>>Ossipoff continually makes this claim. It's false. "Suboptimal" is
>>the trick. It is suboptimal, true, from the point of view of the
>>individual voter maximizing his or her own personal utility, *in some
>>scenarios.* In others, it is clearly optimal to vote "sincerely."
>
Can we please have an example of one of these "other scenarios" that
shows that Mike Ossipoff's
"claim is false"?
I think Warren Schudy put it well in a July 2007 draft paper:
"Range voting is a generalisation of approval voting where you can give
each candidate any score
between 0 and 1. Optimal strategies never vote anything other than 0 or
1, so range voting
complicates ballots and confuses voters for little or no gain."
>If I prefer A>B>C, and those are the only options, it's
>clear that I optimize my expectation by voting A max, B min, but
>where do I rate B? ...
>
>Where do I rate B? Well, if the B utility is midway between A and C,
>we can define a "sincere" rating of B as 50%. If we have rated A max
>and C min. However, that max and min rating is itself a full
>disclosure of the utilities, the ratings have been normalized to the
>election candidate set, causing loss of absolute utilities.
>
>It never hurts the voter personally to normalize in that way.
>
That is only true (probabilistically) if both the "B utility" is
*exactly* midway between A and C
and also (as far as the voter knows) both A and C are
equally likely to win.
It is obvious that in practice the voter in Abd's example could be
"hurt personally" by not voting
B max if that causes C to win instead of B, or by not voting B min if
that causes B to win instead
of A.
Chris Benham
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