[EM] DYN

[Juho]

These methods offer quite interesting and quite radical horse trading  
possibilities. The previous version (without the published rankings  
limitation) is so flexible that it is hard to even imagine what kind  
of trading would take place. In the version below it is possible e.g.  
that some extreme candidates would trade votes and thereby get some  
advantage over the centrist ones. It is also an option not to allow  
trading at all but just to allow the candidates to set their approval  
cutoff where they want (in line with the ranking order). One more  
option would be to allow the voters to cast ranked votes and donate  
the whole vote to one candidate that would then be allowed to put the  
approval cutoff in those votes in the most appropriate position.

Juho


On Jul 12, 2007, at 21:22 , Forest W Simmons wrote:

> In further response to Juho's question about candidates making their
> approval choices before versus after the partial count, here's a
> compromise:
>
> Require the candidates to publish their candidate rankings before the
> election, and then (after the partial info is available to them)
> require them to make approvals consistent with their rankings, so that
> they can approve A without approving B only if B is not ranked  
> ahead of
> A on their published list.
>
> Forest
>
>
>
> ----
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
> list info


		
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