[EM] manipulation free method?

[Forest W Simmons]

Mike,

Yes, the approval strategist would do well with this method.

Those who like to strategize can do so, and those who don't like to can 
just rank the candidates.  Those who don't strategize will (by 
definition) submit sincere rankings.  Those who do strategize can do 
most, if not all, of their strategizing without order reversals, and 
with few collapses of order.  The net effect is sincere rankings, which 
makes for more reliable analysis of the election.

Forest



Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>
>Forest--
>
>As I was saying before, if everyone honestly and very accurately 
indicates 
>the most likely winner, then the method is a lot like DSV, without the 
>incentilve to misrepresent one's preference ordering.
>
>As you said, the strategy incentive is in the indication of the most 
likely 
>winner.
>
>Obviously you'd want to make sure that you're marking your "most likely 
>winner" as someone people like less than your favorite. Or maybe you'd 
mark 
>someone that people like more than your favorite's chief rival. Anyway, 
your 
>likely-winner mark would be strategically chosen.
>
>Everyone would be placing those marks to influence eachother's 
approvals.
>
>The fact that your ballot's probabilty distribution is affected by your 
own 
>likely-winner mark won't keep you from insincerely marking a likely 
winner 
>below your favorite, because you'd want to approvae him/her anyway. And 
it 
>doesn't give you much reason to not mark a likely-winner above your 
chief 
>rival, because wouldn't you be tempted to not approve him/her in an 
ordinary 
>Approval election? So doesn't this become something very similar to 
>Approval?
>
>I have to admit that I don't know exactly how it would play out, when 
you 
>aren't just controlling your own Approval vote, but are also moving 
other 
>peoiple's approvals too. But it seems that you'd have the same 
incentives 
>for both. Wouldn't that make the strategy similar to Approval?
>
>When a method is proposed with the purpose of getting rid of strategy 
need, 
>I'm inclined to ask if it meets SFC and SDSC. Of course it is _not_ 
your 
>responsibility to find that out, because you're not the one advocating 
SFC 
>and SDSC. If I believe those criteria are important, then I can't 
expect 
>anyone else to find out if a new proposed method meets them.
>
>But, at least at first glance, I don't perceive any reason to expect 
the new 
>method to meet those criteria. I fully understand that not everyone 
agrees 
>with me about what is important for a strategy-free method, but, for 
me, to 
>be as strategy-free as wv Condorcet, a method has to meet SFC and SDSC.
>
>Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
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>End of election-methods Digest, Vol 37, Issue 2
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>