[EM] manipulation free method?

Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Mon Jul 2 07:54:36 PDT 2007


Forest--

As I was saying before, if everyone honestly and very accurately indicates 
the most likely winner, then the method is a lot like DSV, without the 
incentilve to misrepresent one's preference ordering.

As you said, the strategy incentive is in the indication of the most likely 
winner.

Obviously you'd want to make sure that you're marking your "most likely 
winner" as someone people like less than your favorite. Or maybe you'd mark 
someone that people like more than your favorite's chief rival. Anyway, your 
likely-winner mark would be strategically chosen.

Everyone would be placing those marks to influence eachother's approvals.

The fact that your ballot's probabilty distribution is affected by your own 
likely-winner mark won't keep you from insincerely marking a likely winner 
below your favorite, because you'd want to approvae him/her anyway. And it 
doesn't give you much reason to not mark a likely-winner above your chief 
rival, because wouldn't you be tempted to not approve him/her in an ordinary 
Approval election? So doesn't this become something very similar to 
Approval?

I have to admit that I don't know exactly how it would play out, when you 
aren't just controlling your own Approval vote, but are also moving other 
peoiple's approvals too. But it seems that you'd have the same incentives 
for both. Wouldn't that make the strategy similar to Approval?

When a method is proposed with the purpose of getting rid of strategy need, 
I'm inclined to ask if it meets SFC and SDSC. Of course it is _not_ your 
responsibility to find that out, because you're not the one advocating SFC 
and SDSC. If I believe those criteria are important, then I can't expect 
anyone else to find out if a new proposed method meets them.

But, at least at first glance, I don't perceive any reason to expect the new 
method to meet those criteria. I fully understand that not everyone agrees 
with me about what is important for a strategy-free method, but, for me, to 
be as strategy-free as wv Condorcet, a method has to meet SFC and SDSC.

Mike Ossipoff





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