[EM] manipulation free method?
Michael Ossipoff
mikeo2106 at msn.com
Mon Jul 2 07:54:36 PDT 2007
Forest--
As I was saying before, if everyone honestly and very accurately indicates
the most likely winner, then the method is a lot like DSV, without the
incentilve to misrepresent one's preference ordering.
As you said, the strategy incentive is in the indication of the most likely
winner.
Obviously you'd want to make sure that you're marking your "most likely
winner" as someone people like less than your favorite. Or maybe you'd mark
someone that people like more than your favorite's chief rival. Anyway, your
likely-winner mark would be strategically chosen.
Everyone would be placing those marks to influence eachother's approvals.
The fact that your ballot's probabilty distribution is affected by your own
likely-winner mark won't keep you from insincerely marking a likely winner
below your favorite, because you'd want to approvae him/her anyway. And it
doesn't give you much reason to not mark a likely-winner above your chief
rival, because wouldn't you be tempted to not approve him/her in an ordinary
Approval election? So doesn't this become something very similar to
Approval?
I have to admit that I don't know exactly how it would play out, when you
aren't just controlling your own Approval vote, but are also moving other
peoiple's approvals too. But it seems that you'd have the same incentives
for both. Wouldn't that make the strategy similar to Approval?
When a method is proposed with the purpose of getting rid of strategy need,
I'm inclined to ask if it meets SFC and SDSC. Of course it is _not_ your
responsibility to find that out, because you're not the one advocating SFC
and SDSC. If I believe those criteria are important, then I can't expect
anyone else to find out if a new proposed method meets them.
But, at least at first glance, I don't perceive any reason to expect the new
method to meet those criteria. I fully understand that not everyone agrees
with me about what is important for a strategy-free method, but, for me, to
be as strategy-free as wv Condorcet, a method has to meet SFC and SDSC.
Mike Ossipoff
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