[EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

[ws at cs.brown.edu]

I've written a short paper that I think you may find interesting. It's still
somewhat drafty, but it's good enough to share.

Here's the abstract:

We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest
Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear
font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet
Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that Condorcet
methods can elect a Condorcet Loser with non-zero probability when voters vote
tactically. With strategic agents, approval voting is better at electing
Condorcet Winners than Condorcet methods!

Paper is available at http://www.cs.brown.edu/~ws/approval.pdf . Please
send comments and/or questions my way.

thanks,
ws

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