[EM] Problem solved (for pure rank ballots): ICC & AFB incompatible (essentially)

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Jan 25 20:01:49 PST 2007

Assuming this is a public election and, therefore, the votes are secret.

Warren assumes identical triplets as voters, thus producing a tie.

To me this is an argument for a random selection of winner from tied 
leaders, especially since rank and rating methods permit voters to clearly 
state their preferences (and ties being rare and reruns expensive in real 
public elections).

I would expect these voters to be as likely to vote a tie with Range.

Apparently Warren assumes a rerun in response to the tie.  These being 
identical triplets, I claim their response to a rerun call could be to 
repeat the same votes - or to each make the SAME modification to their 
votes - letting the tie continue until the authorities amended THEIR 


On Thu, 25 Jan 2007 14:14:14 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 11:37 AM 1/25/2007, warren_d_smith31 wrote:
>>I should have defined clone-immunity and favorite-betrayal.
>>Clone immunity for the purposes of this proof (and it also is
>>I think common usage) is this.
>>If clones of C are added to the election, that does not affect the
>>winner (except perhaps up to replacement of the winner by a clone).
> Okay. Now tell me how this applies to the scenario.
> What is the election before the clone is added, and what is it after.
> If the voters get to change their vote between the two elections, any 
> method will fail ICC. How could it not?
> You are confusing voter strategy with election method, it seems. You 
> are not alone.
> To determine satisfaction of ICC, I believe, the votes from the 
> original election must remain the same, and the votes for the clone 
> are inserted.
> Favorite Betrayal is a different kind of criterion than ICC. Favorite 
> Betrayal is about a voter changing his or her vote. It is assumed 
> that all *other* voters do not change their votes.
> ICC assumes that *no* voter changes his or her votes from the 
> original election, but the voter inserts the clone into the ranks. 
> All other ranks remain undisturbed.
> You cannot test FB and ICC together, because one requires constant 
> voting from all voters and the other requires a change of one vote.
> To repeat this, what is the original election before the insertion of 
> the clone, and how did the insertion of the clone change the election 
> outcome outside the clone set?
> What you have done is to define the existence of a clone by the vote 
> pattern after insertion. But the pattern before insertion is with two 
> candidates. Not three.
> You are testing a three-candidate election against a two-candidate 
> one. That is necessary for ICC, actually. But it is meaningless with FB.

  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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