[EM] NPV white paper - Condorcet flaw

Markus Schulze Markus.Schulze at alumni.TU-Berlin.DE
Mon Jan 22 03:53:00 PST 2007

Dear Warren,

you asked how the NPV bill could be combined with Condorcet methods.

First of all: In my opinion, we should always promote a concrete
Condorcet method rather than Condorcet methods in general.
I recommend that we should promote the Schulze method:


I suggest that the NPV bill and the Schulze method should be
combined as follows:

   Suppose state X has adopted the Schulze method. Then, to
   calculate the NPV winner, state X should interpret an
   individual ballot for candidate A from a state, where FPP
   is being used, as a preferential ballot where this voter
   strictly prefers candidate A to every other candidate and
   is indifferent between all other candidates.

   Similarly, an individual ballot from a state, where IRV (or
   some other method) is being used, but where this state refuses
   to publish the data needed to calculate the pairwise matrix,
   should be interpreted as if this voter strictly prefers his
   top-ranked candidate to all other candidates and is indifferent
   between all other candidates.

   The Schulze method should then be applied to all these
   ballots. And the electors of state X should have to vote
   for the Schulze winner.

Advantage of this suggestion is that also the other states
are encouraged to adopt the Schulze method.

Markus Schulze

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