[EM] Benham "zero info strategy = honesty" criterion

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Thu Jan 4 05:09:03 PST 2007

Range voting is criticized  for disobeying this criterion.
Meanwhile mot rank-ballot systems lik Condorcet, Borda, and IRV
obey it (apparently; I only have proof for Borda).

BUT do they?  It seems to me that in many Condorcet systems in which
equal rankings are permitted, your best zero info vote in a situation
with a bunch of nearly (but not exactly) equal "good" candidates,
and another bunch of nearly-equal "bad" ones, is the rank the good ones
co-equally (but dishonestly) top.

Do you agree this is better strategy?  In which systems?  
In particular I think this is true of Simmons' recent system
(but his recent conversion of it from a very simple to state and understand
system, into a mysterious one, is to be disparaged...)


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