[EM] Asset Voting

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Tue Feb 6 11:33:26 PST 2007


I see that there is no Electowiki page on Asset Voting. So I'm 
starting a thread to gather some commentary on it.

Asset Voting, the name, was apparently invented by Warren Smith. In 
his version, candidates are awarded a number between 0 and 1, with 
the restriction that the sum of numbers awarded should equal one.

Then the total votes received by an individual candidate is 
reassignable by the candidate to create a winner or winners. This 
essentially turns an election where winners do not appear from the 
direct votes into a deliberative process, conducted on behalf of the 
voters by those trusted by them.

It's thus a variation on delegable proxy, which is how I came to be 
interested in it initially.

Variations have been proposed:

(1) Candidates publish a list of reassignments that they will follow. 
However, this loses the flexibility that simple Asset has, the 
negotiation component is lost. If the list is not a binding promise, 
it could be useful. Don't vote for someone you don't trust!

(2) Fractional Approval Asset Voting was my suggestion. In this, the 
votes are restricted to 1 whole vote per candidate, but the ballot is 
normalized so that the sum of votes is one vote. The advantage of 
this simplification is that the ballot is quite simple. The voter 
either delegates his or her vote to a single candidate, or to a 
virtual committee.

(3) It is fairly simple to use Asset Voting for Proportional 
Representation, creating a quite exact peer assembly, with, 
nevertheless, district connection with elected members being quite 
likely for many or most. This is enabled most specificaly by 
encouraging candidates to reassign votes in precinct blocks. (This 
could create some error in precision of number of voters per seated 
member, but at the great advantage of voters knowing *exactly* who 
was elected by their vote.)

I recall having read somewhere about another independent invention of 
Asset Voting, I'd appreciate if anyone has references.

I'll only note one special feature of Asset, one reason why it is 
worthy of serious consideration:

The voter is totally free to vote for anyone. Electability is not 
relevant. There is utterly no pressure for strategic voting. The only 
requirement is that the candidate voted for be one who is 
identifiable and who is willing to take part in the public part of the process:

The reassignment process, presumably, is public; it is not, I would 
think, a fixed thing with all reassignments taking place in one "poll."

If I had my choice of election methods, I'd either pick Asset or 
Delegable Proxy. DP, however, does not create a peer assembly, which 
might be considered desirable; rather it would normally create -- 
unless it is used in the Asset manner -- a body with members having 
variable voting power.




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