[EM] Juho: Your other examples

[Michael Ossipoff]

Juho--

You said:

Here's my example. It is in principle the same one I already used but now 
presented as a bit more realistic scenario.

I reply:

Ok, if it’s effectively the same as your first example, then doesn’t 
everything that I said about your first example apply to this one too?

But I’d like to make a few comments:

We have three candidates: D=Democrat, C=CentristRepublican, 
R=RightWingRepublican. I don't have any small party candidates, and that's 
maybe a deviation from realism, but let's do this simple scenario first. 
Sincere votes: 21: D 21: DC 03: DR 03: CD 26: CR 26: RC Many Democratic 
voters truncated since they were not interested in the Republican party 
internal battle between R and C. The R supporters note that they could vote 
RD and get R elected (with winning votes). They spread the word among the R 
supporters and press to to reach the required number of voters.

I reply:

The obvious problem with that is that such a strategy campaign would also 
inform the intended victims, who would refuse to rank the candidate whose 
voters were trying to steal the election from them. The result would be that 
the offensive order-reversal would backfire.

Offensive order-reversal, for that reason, won’t be a problem. But 
truncation will be a problem with methods (such as margins) that let it be a 
problem.


6 out of the 26 R supporters follow the recommended strategy (=> 20: RC, 06: 
RD). R wins (with winning votes). Is this scenario a credible real life 
scenario?

I reply:

No, because the intended victims would refuse to rank the 
perpetrators’candidate, and so the offensive strategy attempt would 
backfire.

That can be likewise said of your first example, but it’s more obvious in 
this one, in which you mention the press campaign for offensive strategy.

You ask:

Is there a risk that this strategy would backfire?

I reply:

Of course. Why would the strategy’s intended victims rank the perpetrators’ 
candidate?

How often does it happen that supporters of one candidate have the 
possibility to influence the outcome of the election?

I reply:

Examples suggest that that will often be the case.

You said:

P.S. One more example on winning votes and truncation. 49:AB, 48:BC, 2:CA. A 
supporters truncate => C wins.

I reply:

No method can help voters who won’t help themselves by voting for a 
compromise that they need.

You continued:

Or alternatively sincere votes are 49:AB, 48:BC, 2:CB. In this case 
truncation by A supporters makes it possible for C supporters to vote 
strategically 2:CA => C wins (instead of B that was A supporters' second 
favourite).

I reply:

The same comment applies here. Additionally, doesn’t everything that I said 
about your first example apply here too?

Mike Ossipoff