[EM] Warren reply, 2/13/07, 0838 GMT

[Michael Ossipoff]

Warren says:

ok, sorry for my dimness here.

I reply:

That’s ok, Warren; it’s not like it’s the first time.

Warren continues:

Thanks to Benham and Venzke we now have two readable definitions of SFC

I reply:

We agree on one thing: Warren was incapable of reading the definition of 
SFC, and it was necessary for me and others to read it to him.

But if there was anything wrong with the SFC definition, such as ambiguity, 
Warren forgot to tell us where.

Warren quotes two alternative “SFC definitions”.

Let me first say that Kevin’s definition refers specifically to ranking, 
meaning that it applies only to rank methods. SFC applies to all methods, in 
a seamless way, as do all of my defensive strategy criteria.

Both alternative criteria speak of a majority voting X over Y or A over B. 
(If we give Kevin the benefit of the doubt and assume that “rank” means 
“vote”).

In Plurality, if a majority do that, then they must be giving their one and 
only vote to A, which means that they’re voting A over everyone. A is 
already the “voted CW”, the beats-all candidate, which is presumably what 
Benham meant by “CW”.

And there can be no majority of the voters who vote X over Y. Therefore, 
whenever a majority vote A over B, or X over Y, the entire premise of both 
criteria is met. And when a majority do that, obviously B or Y can’t 
possibly win. Therefore (if we can even apply Kevin’s criterion to 
Plurality) Plurality meets both alternative criteria.

Benham-SFC: "If  more than half the voters vote X over Y and it is possible 
to
complete truncated ballots in a way to make X the CW, then Y must not win."

Venzke-SFC: "If more than half of the voters
rank A over B, but there is no majority of the voters ranking some third
candidate over A, then B doesn't win."

Warren continues:

I'm taking their words for it that these are equivalent and to Ossipoff's 
intended
SFC definition.

I reply:

I’m sure you are. It wouldn’t be the first time you made a public fool of 
yourself on EM. In fact, you’ve done little else on EM.

If anyone wonders about Warren’s irrational and desperate attacks, maybe I 
can explain his anger by the fact that it was necessary for me to block his 
e-mail a few days ago.

THE CAPS LOCK CAME ON AND WON’T GO OFF, SO FORGIVE THE CAPITAL LETTERS.

ASIDE FROM THOSE 2 ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA NOT BEING EQUIVALENT TO SFC, THEY 
WOULD MISS SFC’S POINT EVEN IF THEY WERE EQUIVALENT TO IT. SFC DESCRIBES 
FREEDOM FROM STRATEGY, FOR THAT MAJORITY, UNDER THE PLAUSIBLE PREMISE 
CONDITIONS. THAT WAS WHAT I WANTED TO DESCRIBE. FOR THAT REASON, I’D WORD IT 
THAT WAY EVEN IF IT COULD BE WORDED EQUIVALENTLY OTHERWISE

(Here, obviously, the caps went off)

Warren continues:

I don't terribly see why these rather obscure properties should exactly be
the foundation of voting theory

I reply:

I rather doubt that anyone said they were. But I myself consider the 
defensive strategy criteria to be the most important ones, because I believe 
that voting is a joke to the extent that voters are deterred from voting 
their genuine preferences.

Warren continues:

or why they terribly address the issue that started this,
which was the question of whether it can really be said to be true that
in Condorcet you can "fully support A>B and B>C at the same time" whereas in 
range voting
you cannot.

I reply:

Though they don’t address it, they replace it. I told Warren that if he has 
a problem about that statement, which doesn’t relate to actual results, he 
can disregard it, because SFC, GSFC, and SDSC are the best expression of why 
I prefer SSD to RV. And they do relate to results.

My defensive strategy criteria are what I have to say about single-winner 
voting systems. So, in regards to SSD vs. RV, this is what I have to say: 
SFC, GSFC, & SDSC.

But I made it clear what I meant by “fully vote…”. I referred to vote-counts 
between a pair of candidates. In RV of course that has to mean the 
comparison of their vote totals. In Condorcet, where vote totals are 
pair-wise, it has to refer to the pair-wise votes in the pair comparison.

Warren spoke of methods in which the votes have no affect on the outcome. 
That’s quite unlike SSD, where the pair-wise vote totals have everything to 
do with the outcome.

Warren is bothered because the “fully voting X over Y and Y over Z” remark 
doesn’t relate to ultimate_results_. Yes, and that’s why I told him to 
disregard it, and referred Warren to three criteria that definitely relate 
to results.

Participation demonstrates results that Warren doesn’t like, and my 
“fully-voting” comment doesn’t relate to results. So Warren uses 
Participation to show undesirable results in spite someone sincerely and 
fully voting their preferences. But SFC, GSFC, and SDSC refer to results in 
a way that guarantees that certain strategies won’t be needed. That’s what I 
consider important. I don’t expect Warren to agree with me about what’s 
important. I merely explain that SFC, GSFC, and SDSC are the reasons why I 
prefer SSD to RV. Warren has my permission to not share my preference on 
that.

Mike Ossipoff