[EM] Warren's SFC example

[Michael Ossipoff]

Ossipoff: But if Warren has a quibble about what it means to fully vote X 
over Y, then
I refer him to my criteria SFC, GSFC, and SDSC.

--WDS: here is the definition of SFC given by Ossipoff (CW=Condorcet 
winner):
  "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a majority 
of all the voters
  prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win."
  Ossipoff: "[SFC] is met by SSD and other good wv Condorcet versions."
  Ossipoff: "I call [SFC] the pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting."

However, Ossipoff is wrong.  Here is a counterexample. There are 3 voters:
A>B>C
B>C>A
C>A>B *
where the * vote is insincere.  The unstarred two voters are a "majority"
who prefer the sincere-CW (who is B) over C, and who vote sincerely.   But 
the total vote
is a 3-way perfect tie.  Therefore C can win.  But according to Ossipoff's 
SFC, C cannot
win.   This counterexample works against every Condorcet method satisfying 
anonymity.

I reply now:

Warren’s example doesn’t show any candidate pairewise-beating each of the 
others. He explains that by saying that the asterisk-marked ballot is 
“insincere”. If he means that it falsifies a preference, then his example 
doesn’t meet the premises of SFD, and so SFC has nothing to say about what 
should happen in his example.

Warren quoted SFC above, and so he shouldn’t be giving to us an example that 
has falsified preferences.

Mike Ossipoff