[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 42, Issue 76
davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Dec 31 14:36:13 PST 2007
On Mon, 31 Dec 2007 16:50:43 +0200 Juho wrote:
> On Dec 31, 2007, at 15:34 , CLAY SHENTRUP wrote:
>>>Although I have some opinions on Condorcet completion I agree with
>>>Rob that too much energy is spent on the Condorcet completion
>>>debates. All methods that are Condorcet compliant are already quite
>>well, you don't know what you're talking about.
> I could agree that you think that I don't know what I'm talking
> about ;-).
> Your examples (below) seem to be from a Range voting promotion site
> (that explains something). I have read them (or some predecessors of
> them) also earlier. Some quick comments follow (I didn't reread the
> articles carefully now, but you may correct if I missed something).
THANK YOU, Juho!
That Clay could have read an incomplete description, and now tries to pass
it on as if complete, makes a lot of sense.
Time to warn readers of this problem, and to hope that Clay will study
harder to have more useful info to pass on.
> I don't know what the A supporters are doing. They obviously know
> that D has practically no support. They should know that their
> A>D>B>C votes will have no impact alone. And they should know that if
> others join the game then D could be elected with some probability.
> The chances that they would hit their target and make A (or B) win
> are slim.
> In this kind of close race I'd rather advertise A as a good
> compromise candidate rather than presenting him as a bully whose
> supporters want to use whatever means to steal the victory from
> others. That might give better results in a tight race like this.
> With the given numbers it also seems that the C voters need not do
> anything more than just ignore the whole issue. They will win that
> way even if all A and B supporters (extremely improbable in large
> elections) would rank D second.
> Condorcet yields Condorcet winners automatically. No reason to use
> Approval to approximate that.
> I guess this is again a simulation where the distribution of
> strategic voters is assumed to be equal at both sides. What will
> happen if one party is more strategic than the other?
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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