[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 42, Issue 76
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Mon Dec 31 06:50:43 PST 2007
On Dec 31, 2007, at 15:34 , CLAY SHENTRUP wrote:
>> Although I have some opinions on Condorcet completion I agree with
>> Rob that too much energy is spent on the Condorcet completion
>> debates. All methods that are Condorcet compliant are already quite
>> good methods.
> well, you don't know what you're talking about.
I could agree that you think that I don't know what I'm talking
Your examples (below) seem to be from a Range voting promotion site
(that explains something). I have read them (or some predecessors of
them) also earlier. Some quick comments follow (I didn't reread the
articles carefully now, but you may correct if I missed something).
I don't know what the A supporters are doing. They obviously know
that D has practically no support. They should know that their
A>D>B>C votes will have no impact alone. And they should know that if
others join the game then D could be elected with some probability.
The chances that they would hit their target and make A (or B) win
In this kind of close race I'd rather advertise A as a good
compromise candidate rather than presenting him as a bully whose
supporters want to use whatever means to steal the victory from
others. That might give better results in a tight race like this.
With the given numbers it also seems that the C voters need not do
anything more than just ignore the whole issue. They will win that
way even if all A and B supporters (extremely improbable in large
elections) would rank D second.
Condorcet yields Condorcet winners automatically. No reason to use
Approval to approximate that.
I guess this is again a simulation where the distribution of
strategic voters is assumed to be equal at both sides. What will
happen if one party is more strategic than the other?
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