[Election-Methods] hypothetical question re: Approval

[rob brown]

On Dec 30, 2007 10:49 PM, Paul Kislanko <jpkislanko at bellsouth.net> wrote:

> I still think there'd be a problem with folks who spent a few months doing
> their civic duty by learning what the candidates said and thinking about
> issues coming up with a ballot and going away being out-strategized by a
> concerted effort on the part of voting junkies who are more interested in
> getting their party in power than they are about any issue related to the
> public interest.
>

Well, I agree that that is the problem we are trying to solve.  I don't know
if my little scenario solves it or not, I tend to think it would come close,
assuming everyone had equal amount of time on their hands to monitor the
results and tweak their vote (I kind of doubt it would take a lot of time to
have near-equal strategic weight).

Obviously, I prefer automating the process, which to me is exactly what
condorcet does.


> Not only do I think this "perfect knowledge" paradigm results in an
> equilibrium, I beleve at the closing of the voting (shutdown of the server)
> there'd be enough information available to create ranked ballots for each
> voter and to count them however one wished.
>

I don't know about the ranked ballots, since in many elections it might
reach an equilibrium very quickly.

In others, there may be multiple equilibria.  Whether it bounces around
between them or not I don't know...it may well be that once it reaches the
first one, it will stay there.   And different elections, with the same
people and the same preferences, may find a different equilibrium, depending
on the timing and other such "random" things.
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