[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Re: rcv ala tournament

[Juho]

Kevin Venzke replied to Rob Brown:

> You say you don't see much point in discussing various Condorcet  
> methods.
> The ones that I don't like have the quality that sometimes when the
> quantity of voters who rank candidate A, and don't rank candidate B  
> at all,
> is larger than the quantity of voters who rank B at all, B can  
> still win.
>
> Here is a simple example:
> 7 B>C
> 5 C
> 8 A
>
> What do you think? Is there good evidence and logic available for a  
> method
> to decide that B is the best candidate to win?

Kevin, you maybe already know/guess my answer. B is only 2 votes  
short of being a Condorcet winner. C would need 3 and A 5 votes.

In your comments I note that you may think that listing a candidate  
(higher than default bottom) has a special meaning. If there is  
something like an implicit approval cutoff after the listed  
candidates (=> 7 B>C>>A, 5 C>>A=B, 8 A>>B=C) then that should be  
explicitly mentioned. The used method could in this case count both  
the pairwise preferences and the approvals (A and C would be more  
approved than B), and the result could be something different than  
with pure ranking based ballots.

Although I have some opinions on Condorcet completion I agree with  
Rob that too much energy is spent on the Condorcet completion  
debates. All methods that are Condorcet compliant are already quite  
good methods.

Juho





	
	
		
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